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LAW AND LAWYERING:
LEGAL STUDIES WITH AN INTERACTIVE FOCUS*
PEGGY C. DAVIS**

I. INTRODUCTION

J. Max Bond, Jr., a contemporary architect of extraordinary skill and

sensitivity, practices and teaches architecture that is centered, not upon
objects, but upon process and relationship. Bond's vision extends beyond
structures. Where others see constructed objects as manifestations of
individual creative will, Bond sees objects that develop and evolve in "a
complicated creative process... that begins before an architect designs
and continues beyond the construction of a building to include revisions
by its inhabitants."' He writes that "the creation of a building engages
many people, in addition to the architect, in a process that evolves through
a series of choices, responses, and insights." 2 He sees the many people
involved in the architectural process, not as obstacles, but as respected
collaborators. He aspires to participate in the design of structures that will
"not simply house people, but.., reflect their aspirations, respond to
their 'will to form' and serve their

.

. .

needs. "' He sees in the

architectural process manifestations of the culture and the heritage of the
participants. Building (as one must) in societies dominated by particular
values and power centers, he has aspired "to give form to the strivings of
average people."' Bond's focus on process has enhanced his sensitivity
to the ways in which the strivings of average people can be silenced in
professionalized, complex, and expensive processes. At the same time, it
has taught him strategies for contributing "to progress and popular
empowerment. "5
* @ Copyright by Peggy C. Davis 1993.
** Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Financial support for
the research reported in this article was provided by the Filomen D'Agostino and Max
E. Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School of Law. Invaluable
research assistance was provided by Avrohom Kess and Bernard Weintraub.
1. J. MaxBond, Jr., The BlackArchitect'sExperience, ARCmrECrURALREC., June
1992, at 60, 61 (book review).
2. J. Max Bond, Jr., AutobiographicalEssay, in AFRICAN AMERICAN ARCHrrECrS
IN CURRENT PRACTIcE 22 (Jack Travis ed., 1991).
3. id.
4. Id.

5. Id.
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One can study, teach, or work with a rule of law as if it were an
edifice; a creative product of the judicial or lawyerly mind; a thing unto
itself. Increasingly, however, we have come to study, to teach, and to
practice law as Bond has studied, taught, and practiced architecture: As
something created, and regularly recreated, in a complex world. As an
interactive process involving the choices, responses, and insights of a
variety of actors. As a reflection of values and of power. As a product and
representation of culture. As an enterprise that reflects the needs and the
will to form of a few or the needs and the will to form of many,
depending upon the manner in which it is practiced.
I have used the term contextual criticism to refer to the study of law
in the manner of Bond-as interactive, culturally embedded process."
Contextual criticism is exemplified by the work of Gerald Lopez who, in
writing about civil-rights law, does not limit himself to the letter of a
statute or to its reading by an appellate justice, but begins his analysis as
a client's trouble brews. Lopez imagines the ways in which the trouble
and the remedy are conceptualized by the client. He exposes the lawyer's
struggle to cast the trouble in terms that fit opportunistically with the letter
of a law or with its prior judicial readings. He challenges lawyers to give
less deference to learned readings and more expression to the client's
conceptualizations and will to form.' Similarly, when Lucie White writes
about public-benefits law, she focuses upon the lawyer-client interaction
to expose the stories that emerge and the stories that are suppressed as
flesh is given to skeletal legal terms like "necessity" and "reliance." 8 And
when Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun analyze the law by which Native
American land claims are determined, they focus upon the irony that tribe
members, whose lives and histories gave meaning to the term tribe, are
unable, in their interactions with lawyers and judges, to affect the
construction of a legal definition of "tribe" that negates both their history
and their claim. 9
As the Lopez, the White, and the Torres and Milun examples show,
contextual legal critics have been drawn to the lawyer-client interaction
for insights concerning the evolution and uses of legal rules. Seeing
lawyers as keepers of a repertoire of normative stories, and clients as
bearers of troubles and aspirations, these scholars have taken a fresh look
6. See Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism:A Demonstration Exploring
Hierarchy and "Feminine"Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1642-43 (1991).
7. See Gerald Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:Seven Weeks in the Life
of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEo. L.J. 1603 (1989).
8. Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing ofMrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 24-31, 46-47 (1990).
9. See Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating "Yonnondio" by Precedentand
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DuKE L.J. 625, 647-55.
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at the familiar process by which the lawyer decides and argues the fit
between legal stories and real-world plights. They have urged lawyers to
be self-conscious about interactive process, for they have found that the
characteristics of interactive lawyering can determine whether the needs
and values of consumers in the legal system are reflected, reshaped, or
ignored.
This article reports preliminarily upon ongoing work in the tradition
of contextual criticism. The work has been done within the New York
University Lawyering Theory Colloquium, an interdisciplinary
collaboration of students and faculty interested in the analysis of lawyering
as a means to a deeper understanding of law. It involves a sustained effort
to develop more formal methodologies for exposing the processes by
which troubles and aspirations in the world become, or fail to become,
"matters" or "cases" and move to formal or informal resolution through
lawyering or judging.
In an earlier report of work in this tradition, I maintained the focus
on lawyer-client interactions that was characteristic of earlier contextual
legal criticism. Borrowing tools from disciplines concerned with discourse
analysis, gender patterning, and narrative structure, I searched the
language of simulated lawyer-client interviews in an effort to expose
unconsidered ways of interacting that affect the evolution from trouble or
aspiration to legal outcome. I found that people in the role of lawyers
assumed a decidedly dominant role in interactions with their clients. They
controlled the flow of topics and, after the initial telling of the client's
story, talked more than their clients. ' People in the role of clients
behaved consistently with the assumption of lawyer-dominance. They
spoke more haltingly," used more hedges,"2 and made more frequent
use of other linguistic forms associated with tentativeness."3 Despite these
rather consistent signs of attorney-dominance and client-deference, it was
possible to identify interactive patterns that distinguished relatively
controlled and relatively open interviewing styles. The more controlled
style was suggestive of what Erving Goffman described as a "state of
inquiry," directed by the professional, rather than by the client or
subject. 4 It was characterized by greater asymmetry in the lawyer's and
10. See Davis, supra note 6, at 1663-64, 1668-69.
11. See id. at 1665.

12. See id. at 1664-66.
13. See id. (reporting the use of superfluous intensifiers and the use of mental
verbs).
14. ERvINa GOFFMAN, FoRMs OF TALK 14243 (1981). Goffinan illustrates the
"state of inquiry" by reference to a study of words exchanged between a pediatrician and
the mother of a patient:
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the client's assertions of conversational control and expressions of
tentativeness, with the lawyer asking far more questions, making far more
requests, and dominating the choice and flow of topics, and the client far
more likely to speak in halting, uncertain, and imprecise terms." The
more open style was suggestive of what Goffman referred to as a mutually
directed "state of talk." 6 It was characterized by shared control of the
flow of topics, client participation in the choice of topics and the making
1
of requests, and greater symmetry in the use of uncertainty signs.
These two styles of interviewing were suggestive of two styles of
lawyering. The controlling lawyering style more quickly socialized the
client into conceiving of a problem in terms of readily apparent legal
categories. By contrast, the more open lawyering style exploited
opportunities associated with the maxim of "relevance." 18 The lawyer
manifesting the more open approach operated with a presumption that
everything the client said was relevant-that it made sense in terms of
norms that might be recognized in law or in a more broadly conceived
problem-solving context. Keeping sight of the possible applicability of a
variety of norms, the more open lawyer interfered less with the client's
ways of conceptualizing a problem and was able to consider a wider range
of interpretive possibilities.
The use of formal, interdisciplinary methods for examining interactive
aspects of lawyering seemed, on the basis of the initial-interview study,
to hold promise. Microanalyses of lawyer-client interviews exposed
learned and automatic ways of behaving like lawyers and behaving like
clients. As a result, they provided the means to become self-conscious
about aspects of the lawyer-client relationship that inhibit the
unpredictable and constrain choice.
In this article, I attempt to put microanalytic methodologies to related
but different uses. Looking beyond the discourse of the lawyer-client
[S]ocial and professional status allow [the doctor] to be very businesslike; he
is running through the phases of an examination, or checklist, not a
conversation .... Mhe mother may not know with any specificity what any
of the doctor's acts are leading up to or getting at, her being "in on" the
instrumentally meaningful sequence of events in no way being necessary for
her contribution to it.
Id. at 142.
15. See Davis, supra note 6, at 1659-61.
16. GOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 143; see also Davis, supra note 6, at 1660
(illustrating Goffinan's "state of inquiry" in a lawyer-client context).
17. See Davis, supra note 6, at 1660-61.
18. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDs 22-40 (1989); STEPHEN C.
LEVINSoN, PRAGMATICS 102-03 (1983); DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON,
RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 118-23 (1986).
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interview, I examine the discourse of advocacy. In doing so, I consider
whether the interactive patterns that serve to maintain or reduce
hierarchical role assumptions between professional and client function
similarly-or analogously-as a case develops from the intake and
counseling phase to the advocacy phase. Specifically, I examine an excerpt
from a brief session of simulated informal advocacy, testing for uses of
devices that signaled control or openness on the part of the lawyer in the
interview setting. I then consider what functions those devices might serve
when the aim is advocacy rather than lawyer-client communication.

II. THE TEXT
As the NYU Lawyering Theory Colloquium provides a context for the
theoretical study of law as an interactive, culturally embedded process, the
NYU Lawyering Program provides a context in which students can
experience and analyze the wide range of intellectual and interactive
processes that constitute lawyering. The program gives attention to
lawyering functions that are often neglected in law-school curricula. It has
a developed pedagogy for making students thoughtful and self-conscious
in the processes of identifying issues and goals, gathering facts, planning,
preparing documents, counseling, negotiating, arguing in formal and
informal settings, and presenting evidence to a tribunal. The centerpiece
of that pedagogy is a series of simulation exercises in which students act
as lawyers, clients, and witnesses. The Lawyering Program is also a
laboratory for developing, within the Colloquium, ways of studying and
teaching the full range of lawyering functions. The text for this study is
an excerpt from a videotaped and transcribed simulation drawn from a
Lawyering exercise in informal advocacy for analysis in the Lawyering
Theory Colloquium. It is a meeting between a lawyer and a bureaucrat
during which the lawyer solicits action on behalf of a client. The lawyer
is, then, functioning as an advocate, while the bureaucrat functions as a
decision maker.
The client was fired from his job, arguably as the result of a
garnishment. Federal legislation prohibits the firing of an employee on the
basis of a garnishment for a single debt and places enforcement of the
prohibition within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor.19 After
the firing, the client approached the bureaucrat, an investigator from the
Department of Labor, but the investigator advised the client that she was
unable to help him to regain his job. The client then took the matter to a
legal clinic, and it was decided that a lawyer from the clinic would
approach the investigator with the goal of persuading her to reconsider
taking on the case. The role of the lawyer-advocate is played by a faculty
19. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1674(a), 1676 (1988).
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member teaching in the Lawyering Program and enacting a plan prepared
by a team of students. The role of the bureaucrat-decision maker is played
by a student with experience as a federal employee. The excerpt chosen
for analysis consists .of the lawyer's initial telling of the case story-the
lawyer's opening narrative-and, for purposes of comparison, the
investigator's answering narrative-a narrative offered in response to the
opening narrative and containing the bureaucrat's version of the client's
situation. The text is reproduced as an appendix. You will find it helpful
to read it now, before proceeding to Part III.
I.

THE ANALYSis

In the study of simulated lawyer-client interviews, an initial analysis
of narrative form suggested themes that later proved to be characteristic
of each interaction. The client's ability to structure a complete opening
narrative seemed inhibited or facilitated in ways that foreshadowed the
linguistic patterns that made for closed or open styles of lawyering. In
the advocacy episode under consideration here, analysis of aspects of
narrative form exposes conscious or unconscious negotiating strategies of
the participants. In the interviews, a stunted or developed opening
narrative suggested a lawyering relationship that was relatively closed or
open to the client's initiatives and conceptualizations. In the episode of
informal advocacy, choices made in the structuring of the opening
narrative establish themes that frame the negotiation concerning the
client's plight and introduce explicit and embedded value judgments
against which the decision maker will judge the case.
The opening narratives of the advocate and the decision maker are
similar in length and in structure. Each employs classic devices for
structuring the tale and for orienting the reader to its intended message.
In Part M.A., I describe these devices, review their uses in both the
advocate's and decision maker's narratives, and highlight the ways in
which themes are set and values are embedded as the devices are
manipulated. In Part III.B., I explore the relationship between narrative
structure and linguistic patterns of deference and domination.
A. Narrative Form
1. Designation of Hero and Establishment of Plight
Professor Bruner has offered a "minimal and austere" definition of
narrative that provides concepts and vocabulary for classifying the
20. See Davis, supra note 6, at 1661.
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ingredients of the advocate's and decision maker's tales. He describes
narrative as
a text-like account [of] a sequence of events involving human (or
human like) actors that starts with an implied or explicit steady or
legitimate state of affairs that is then disrupted or interfered with
by a precipitating event or state of affairs that creates a condition
of crisis which is then either redressed or allowed to perdure as
a new steady state.21
It is useful to dissect a tale, giving separate attention to the choice of
actors, the definition of a steady or legitimate state, the description of a
precipitating event, and the resolution. The following dissection of the
opening narratives follows the Brunerian categories, touching first the
matter of casting, then, under the broader label of plight definition, the
delineation of steady state and precipitating event, and finally, the matter
of resolution.
Actors in the tales woven by advocates and decision makers in the
legal system are, for the most part, given, rather than chosen. They are
the parties involved in the trouble for which legal redress is sought, the
players in the legal system called to respond to the case, and the outsiders
whose lives or interests affect or will be affected by the outcome.
Nonetheless, players in the system have flexibility to make choices in
casting their stories, and those choices can have surprising effects.
Consider the choices of leading and supporting actors in the opening
narratives under review. It is given that the situation of the client is a
matter to which the decision maker has been asked to respond. What the
client did and what the agency did are therefore predictable ingredients in
both stories. The differences between the stories, and the effectiveness of
the stories, depend in this first telling on their centering and focus. The
stories begin to be centered as central and supporting roles are established.
The advocate's narrative stars a diligent client working hard to pay his
debts. The advocate gives himself a supporting role in which he offers pro
bono assistance to the client (thereby suggesting a conclusion that the
client is worthy of help) and serves as a tempter, proposing ways for the
client to evade his fiscal responsibilities (thereby suggesting that the client
21. Jerome Bruner, Narrative,Legal and Otherwise, Lecture Four of the Lawyering
Theory Colloquium at New York University School of Law 7-8 (Spring 1991) (transcript
on file with the author). For a less austere definition, see JEROME BRUNER, AcTs OF

MEANING 43-55 (1990). For an additional valuable analysis of the bare bones of
narrative, see Wllam Labov & Joshua Waletzky, NarrativeAnalysis: Oral Versions of
PersonalEvperience, in EssAYS ON THE VERBAL AND VISUAL ARTS-PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 1966 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ETHNOLOGICAL SociETY 12, 41 (June
Helm ed., 1967).
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is noble). In addition, the advocate embeds the client's story in an
incipient story starring the decision maker. The decision maker is

introduced as a person, sympathetic to the central character, whose ethos,
or way of working, or (to use Bruner's term) steady state, is unknown.
The introduction of this character begins a narrative tension that well
serves the advocate's purposes, for, as the interview progresses, the steady
state of the decision maker comes to stand for the legal and policy position
that serves, or fails, to provide a basis for helping the sympathetic client.
But the decision maker's story cannot yet be developed. The character
with a developed story-the character with an identifiable steady state that
is disrupted, creating crisis and inviting resolution-is the client.
Although the decision maker briefly tells a story that features the
client, the client's story is not central in the decision maker's opening, but
embedded and incidental. Her central narrative is not the story of the
client. Nor is it the story of an individual decision maker with the capacity
to help a person in need. It is the story of a beleaguered agency with a
worthy mission-an agency with limited resources that wants to help as
many people as possible and must avoid getting into trouble by letting its
sympathies lead it to waste resources and credibility on a losing case. The
client appears as a young lad who transgressed by calling in sick and is
suffering as a result of that behavior. But his story is not the central focus;
it is a siren song tempting the agency from its course.
Having chosen leading characters, the advocate and decision maker
have no difficulty in delineating their plights. For the client, the steady
state is diligent, hard work and the reduction of debt. The precipitating
event is not (at this stage of the conversation) precisely delineated, but it
includes financial distress and garnishment with its sequelae of firing,
irremediable unemployment, and deepening debt. For the agency, with its
limited resources, the steady state is providing maximum public benefit by
taking only winning cases with broad impact. The precipitating event-the
problem-is the client's call for help.
In the advocate's tale, resolution does not come. The client remains
in a "Catch-22," and the tension generated by his new and unhappy
equilibrium begins to drive the interlocking story of the decision maker,
who may hold the key to resolution. In the decision maker's tale, it
appears that the resolution will be rejection of the client's call for help-a
putting aside of temptation that leaves the agency on course and removes
the threat to its success and progress. But what builds as a story of
rejection, shifts as the tale nears its conclusion. In a move that should
suggest to the advocate that there is time and room for negotiation, the
decision maker moves out of the past tense and begins to speak in
conditional terms. As she does so, the story of rejection becomes
interpretable as speculation about rejection: "[Tihe garnishment was just

19921

LIWAND L4WYERING

one 'of many reasons." ' "[T]hat would get us into trouble.
Should-should we decide to sympathize enough to engage any resources
in this. "I
The selection of characters, the delineation of plight, and the hedging
of resolution establish themes and tensions that continue throughout much
of the conversation between the advocate and the decision maker. The
advocate continues to focus on the sympathetic and unhappy situation of
his client, and he attempts to construct an ethos or steady state for the
agency that makes helping the client consistent with its mission rather than
a threat to its mission. He continues to juxtapose the situation of the client
and the idea that the decision maker holds the only hope of favorable
resolution. He tries to keep the client onstage and to cast him with an
individual decision maker rather than with an impersonal bureaucracy. The
decision maker resists taking a major role. She continues to focus on the
larger picture, to keep the agency onstage, and to define the agency's
mission so that the client's case remains a diversion rather than an
opportunity. Nonetheless, she avoids giving the story of the beleaguered
agency a definitive resolution and thereby keeps open the door to
negotiation with the advocate.'
2. Orientation and Coda
The establishment of a steady state entails the embedding of values.
It is "performative," not in the more fundamental sense described by J.L.
Austin,' but in the subterranean sense described by James Boyd
White.' It passes positive judgment upon a state by the very act of
making that state a norm and making its continuation or return an
objective of the protagonist and of other sympathetic actors in a story.
22. Appendix at p. 207 (emphasis added).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. In a complementary analysis, Professor Anthony Amsterdam has demonstrated
that the advocate tells a story in which the agency moves from beingjudgment maker to
being doer, while the bureaucrat tells a story in which the agency moves from being doer
to being judgment maker.
25. See J.L. AuSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WoRDs 6 (1962).
26. See JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES Bow 139-65 (1985).

27. The persuasiveness of this kind of embedded valuation is analogous to the
effectiveness of a suggestion embedded in descriptive form. Elizabeth F. Loftus and
Edith Green exposed witnesses of a staged event to a misleading description of one of
the persons witnessed. They were told that the person had a moustache when he did not.
When the incorrect information was in the form, "Was the moustache worn by the tall
intruder light or dark brown?," 26% of the subjects incorporated it in subsequent
descriptions. When the incorrect information was in the form, "Did the intruder who was
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The advocate centered his story around a client whose life was disturbed
by events that made it impossible for him to work hard and pay his debts.
He established the client as a sympathetic character whose goal was to
return to his hard-working, debt-reducing state. With these moves, the
advocate ascribed value to the client's lifestyle. In centering her story
around an agency that worked by picking winning cases with broad
impact, the decision maker ascribed value to that way of functioning.
The introductions and conclusions of the opening narratives-the
sections identified as "orientation" and "coda"-were equally rich in
valuative import. Stories typically begin with a segment that orients the
listener to time, place, and behavioral situation.' In some stories, this
orientation section describes the steady state that will be disrupted as the
tale progresses.' The orientation can also serve to alert the listener to
what the tale means to the teller.' Similarly, as the end of a tale is
signaled-usually by a shift of tense or perspective 3 -a valuative coda
is typically offered in the form of a comment upon the meaning of the
tale. 2 In the analysis of stories told in lawyering contexts, orientations
and codas are check points at which the values and objectives of
participants are often revealed with special candor and clarity. The
opening narratives of the advocate and the decision maker are no
exception.
The advocate's orientation frames the client's trouble as something
that both parties to the conversation find sympathetic and as something
that might be addressed by them or not depending upon the resolution of
an open question. He begins his narrative by striking a grateful and
hopeful tone, acknowledging that the decision maker has been
understanding of the client's situation. He then refers to the decision
maker's initial refusal of the call for intervention, ascribing it to local
policy. He puts the local policy on the table as something open for
discussion and interpretation by professing an inability to understand it.
He weighs in with an implicit positive evaluation of the client by reporting
tall and had a moustache say anything to the professor?," the percentage of subjects
incorporating it rose to 39%. Elizabeth F. Loftus &Edith Green, Warning:Even Memory
for FacesMay Be Contagious, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 323, 331-32 (1980).
28. Labov & Waletzky, supra note 21, at 32.
29. Bruner, supranote 21, at 8.
30. See id.
31. Labov and Waletzky give examples of these transition devices, such as following
an actor to the present tense: "And you know that man who picked me out of the water?
[Ie's a detective in Union City, and I see him every now and again." Labov &
Waletzky, supra note 21, at 40.
32. Id. at 39-41.
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his offer to try to resolve "this"-the trouble-without fee. The tense then
shifts, and the trouble is told.
The advocate's coda is marked by a reference to the story of the client
as a "this" upon which comment is made from another dimension. As
Labov and Waletzky have pointed out, this transition device has the effect
of standing in one moment of time and pointing to the narrative as if it
existed in another.' The coda repeats the effort to hold open the
premises upon which the appropriateness of a favorable action by the
decision maker will be judged, asking why, in a situation like "this,"
agency intervention is not appropriate.
The decision maker begins her tale by establishing that she is in a
superior position both to define the premises for agency action and to
judge the worthiness of the client's case in terms of those premises. She
points out that the advocate is admittedly "not familiar with dealing with"
the agency.' The decision maker's coda is marked by a shift to present
tense and a reference back to the subsidiary narrative of the client.
Pointing to her story of the young man who acted somewhat irresponsibly
and must suffer the consequences-the precipitating event that has caused
the agency trouble-the case that cannot be won, she says "that" would
get the agency into trouble.
3. Uncertainty and the Selection of Narrative Voice
Professor Bruner often calls attention to the "inward turn" of
modernist literary narrative, observing that fiction writers have
"dethron[ed] the omniscient narrator who knew both about the world 'as
it was' and about what... protagonists were making of it."3' Readers
are no longer given certain realities in the voice of an all-knowing teller
of tales; they are given thoughts and observations in the voices of
presumably fallible characters. Bruner speculates that life has imitated art
in this respect and that mundane narrative has also become less certain by
shifting to the voice of real, rather than perfect, reporters.' Bruner's
insight concerning the relationship between voice and certitude and his
speculation concerning nonliterary narrative inform examination of the
uses of voice in the opening narratives of the advocate and the decision
maker.
33. Id.
at 40.
34. Appendix at p. 206.
35. BRUNER, supra note 21, at 51.

36. Id.
at 52.
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The advocate opens his narrative in the voice of the client with a
compliment to the decision maker,37 but thereafter his opening narrative
is told in his own voice or in the voice of an omniscient narrator. The
decision maker refers to the perspective of the advocate,3" and,
consistently with her effort to posit an agency decision rather than an
individual decision, she sometimes invokes the plural voice. But her tale
is also told primarily from her own perspective or from that of an
omniscient narrator. Shifts of voice in both narratives therefore consist
primarily of shifts from reports of the speaker's thoughts and perceptions
to reports of the pronouncements of an omniscient narrator. As a result,
shifts of voice can be roughly tracked by a monitoring of "mental verbs."
A "mental verb" reports an operation of the speaker's mind
concerning a thing external to the speaker's mind: "I think the car is red,"
or "The car seems red." The subjective account produced by mental verb
use stands in contrast to the seemingly objective account produced when
the voice of the omniscient narrator is used: "The car is red." Researchers
who have studied linguistic signs of dominance and deference have
interpreted mental verbs as signs of uncertainty and counted them as
markers of a tentative and powerless discourse style." It is true that the
use of a mental verb hedges an assertion and therefore makes it more
tentative. There are indications, however, that the use of mental verbs has
more complex and more strategic meaning than the use of uncertainty
signs that are not associated with the selection of voice. In the analysis of
simulated lawyer-client interviews, mental verbs appeared in different
patterns than did other linguistic signs of tentativeness, and they appeared
to reflect an openness to discussion of the parties' states of mind rather
than (or in addition to) simple tentativeness.'4 In this analysis, mental
verbs were tracked as possibly strategic manipulations of voice.
Mental verbs appeared in the two opening narratives at a ratio of nineto-three, with the decision maker using them nine times for every three
uses by the advocate. Moreover, while mental verbs were used throughout
the decision maker's narrative, they occurred in the advocate's narrative
only in the orientation and in the coda. The patterns of mental verb use in
these passages seemed to reflect strategic choices-at an indeterminable
level of consciousness-to indicate explicitly that certain things are
believed or thought and that certain other things simply are. The advocate
speaks of the agency position as he sees it, but he paints the plight and
37. Appendix at p. 206.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., John M. Conley et al., The Power ofLanguage:PresentationalStyle
in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1379-80 (1979); BENT PREISLER, LINcO sTIC
SEX ROLES IN CONVERSATION 75-117 (1986).
40. Davis, supra note 6, at 1666-67.
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justice of his client's situation as it is, using the voice of an omniscient
narrator. The decision maker describes agency constraints as they are, but
she signals a willingness to reconsider the merits of the client's case by
describing the client's situation as she sees it.
More specifically, the advocate's narrative begins in the voice of the
client, as the decision maker is told that she has been understanding. A
positive value judgment is made by the client in need, about the
prospective rescuer. Next, reference is made, in omniscient voice, to the
decision maker's announced position about local policy. In a tentative
version of his own voice, the lawyer expresses doubt about the meaning
of the statement. There is an implicit request for clarification by the
decision maker. In omniscient voice, the decision maker is told that her
description was clear, but that the lawyer lacks the sophistication to
understand it. She is also told that the advocate will act, but won't be
paid, leaving the implication that the lawyer's ability to act is limited. The
story continues in omniscient voice. The client is in a bad situation. It is
a "Catch-22." With a new job, he is subject to another garnishment. With
a garnishment, he can'tpay his debts. He is anxious to pay. The advocate
suggested ways out. The client wanted no part of it. He was serious about
paying his debts.
After presenting the plight of the client in omniscient voice, the
advocate shifts to his own perspective and out of the narrative. He wasn't
sure. He thought he would explore the matter with the decision maker.
The invitation is to move to the present tense and answer the question,
"What really is your local policy?," and/or resolve the central dilemma.
The return to the subjective voice reinforces the suggestion, implicit in the
repeated move of asking about local policy, that the policy is subject to
question rather than clear and fixed.
The decision maker opens her narrative with a reference to the
advocate's perspective, noting that he has conceded unfamiliarity with
agency operations. By this move, she establishes her authority with respect
to the question that the advocate has left open. She begins, in omniscient
voice, to report the agency's stance. Its resources are limited. She shifts
for a moment to her own voice, opining ("I think") that everybody
understands. In omniscient, but slightly tentative, voice, she says that the
department strives for high impact and efficiency. Then, from the
collective but subjective perspective of the "we," she doubts ("we're not
sure" that the client's case is a winner. In her own voice, she doubts ("I
can't really see") that it would have high impact. Continuing in the "I"
perspective, she tells a different story of the client: As she sees it, he is
an irresponsible kid. She thinks that the garnishment was not the reason
for the firing. She thinks that these facts make the case unwinnable. She
really can't see winning it.
In the decision maker's story, the hero is a conscientious agency
looking for a good case that will help a lot of people. This is said in
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certain terms. Good cases are provided by virtuous workers in distress,
not by workers who are in distress as a result of their transgressions. The
agency ponders the case of the client and opines, but does not state in
certain terms, that the client lacks virtue and is therefore an inappropriate
vehicle for making the case that will help the many. The turn passes to the
lawyer to provide a better, more suitable, version of his client.
By these selections of voice, the parties to the conversation reinforced
the valuative contexts set by the selections of hero and plight and flagged
by the orientations and codas. The advocate's choices of hero and plight
set a context in which valuations would be made in terms of the client's
steady state (diligently working and paying) and his need to resolve a
crisis (financial distress followed by garnishment and firing). His
orientation and coda suggested that the meaning of his story was that the
client and his plight warranted sympathy and help, while a prior decision
not to help was made on questionable grounds. His choices of voice
complement these moves. He makes the plight of the client seem certain
by offering it in certain voice. He makes the basis for denying help seem
uncertain by referring to it, and only to it in his own voice. The decision
maker's choices of hero and plight set a context in which valuations would
be made in terms of the agency's steady state (doing good for the greatest
number) and its need to resolve a crisis (the lure of the sympathetic but
unworthy case). Her orientation and coda suggested that, although the
advocate was not in a position to know it, the agency and its plight
warranted sympathy. Her choices of voice only partially complemented
these moves. She made the steady state of the agency seem certain by
describing it only in omniscient voice, but she made the plight of the
agency seem questionable by describing and judging the precipitating event
(the client's story) in her own voice.
It is unlikely that any of these selections was consciously made. It is
likely, however, that the advocate's conviction that his case depended
upon a sympathetic portrayal of the client led him to speak in certain
terms about the client's virtues, and his understanding that success might
require negotiation of the meaning of local policy led him to speak in
uncertain terms about that policy. The decision maker's choices of voice
are more difficult to interpret. The advocate's choices have been
interpreted on the assumption (reasonable, but not inevitable) that he
intended to advance the interests of his client. The decision maker cannot,
however, be presumed to be an advocate for agency policy, for her earlier
view of the case at hand, or for any other position. Her role is more
ambiguous and more complex. She is required not only to know and to
uphold agency policy, but also to serve victims of statutory wrongs and,
perhaps, to formulate or to interpret agency policy. Because of these
ambiguities and complexities, it is possible to interpret her choices of
voice in at least two ways.
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On the one hand, we could say that they were a product of a stance
of openness with respect to some, but not to all, of the issues at play. She
had an investment in agency policy-a professional responsibility to know
it and to implement it. She was not open to modification of her views with
respect to that policy. But she was willing to be persuaded on the question
of the worthiness of the client and his claim. The steady state of the
agency was fixed, but the nature of its plight was an open question, and
she was prepared to treat it as such.
The alternative interpretation is suggested by research indicating that
the speech of women is habitually deferential and more heavily peppered
with uncertainty signs like the subjective voice or the mental verb.4 In
light of this research, it is reasonable to ask whether the female decision
maker mitigated the force of her defense of the initial rejection of the
client's 'claim out of a habit of deference rather than a stance of
openness.42 Some evidence exists that she did not. As the following
discussion of other signs of uncertainty will show, her speech was, on the
whole, less deferential than that of the advocate. Moreover, when we look
beyond the frequency of mental verb use to explore the patterns of mental
verb use, the decision maker's tentative speech seems more strategic than
habitual. She was as certain about the agency's steady state or policies as
she was uncertain about its plight or the worthiness of the client's case.
Whatever the truth of this matter, it is useful to focus upon the differential
effects of the parties' narrative choices with respect to voice so that we
might have the capacity to measure those effects against alternative stances
and strategies.
B. Uncertainty as a Sign of Deference
The mental verb is one of a number of signals of tentativeness or
uncertainty that have engaged the attention of conversation analysts. As a
group, linguistic signs of uncertainty have been associated with the speech
of: (1) women;' (2) people of low social status;" (3) people who tend
to assume a "socio-emotional," as opposed to a "task-oriented" function
inconversation;' and (4) those who tend to focus on relationships rather
41. See supratext accompanying notes 39-40; infra notes 43-48 and accompanying
text.
42. In a similar spirit, we might ask whether the advocate's strategic choices were
influenced by habits of domination, for it is possible to conceive a more deferential
strategy that is equally consistent with furtherance of the client's interests.
43. See DAvID GRADDOL & JOAN SWANN, GENDER VOICES 83-88 (1989);
PREISLER, supranote 39, at 284; Conley et al., supra note 39, at 1379.
44. See Conley et al., supra note 39, at 1380.
45. See PRBIsLER, supra note 39, at 284.
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than upon rules or principles.' The use of linguistic signs of uncertainty
has been taken to denote or suggest powerlessness and found to reduce the
credibility of witness testimony. 47 Analysts have identified a "powerless"
discourse style, characterized as tentative, supplicating, and oriented to
human interaction, as contrasted with a "powerful" discourse style,
relatively free of signs of uncertainty and characterized by certainty,
assertiveness, and focus on principles.'

In a context of informal advocacy, one might expect that the tentative
discourse style would be associated with the supplicating, rather than with
the decision-making, role. On the other hand, in the context of the
fragment of informal advocacy under study, one might expect that the
male supplicant would use a more "powerful" style than the female
decision maker. Analysis of the text supports the former hypothesis.
In commenting upon this exchange between advocate and decision
maker,49 Jerome Bruner, a founding member of the Lawyering Theory
Colloquium, identified three linguistic and narrative patterns that
established a theme of a powerful decision maker and a helpless advocate
and client. Anthony Amsterdam, the creator of the Lawyering Program
and also a founding member of the Colloquium, had demonstrated in the
interview analyses the value of focusing upon the sentence by sentence
casting decisions that mark agentivity (is it, "why don't you describe the
problem for me?" or is it, "what is the problem?").' Taking the same
approach, Bruner observed first that the advocate's opening remarks
consistently established the decision maker as agent, containing in the first
sixty-seven words seven clauses in which her agentivity was
recognized.5" Similarly, in the same sixty-seven words, there were "8
instances of you and its derivatives[5' but] ... only two instances of the
46. See JOHN M. CONLEY & WIInAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERsus REmATONSHIIS
80-81 (1990).
47. Conley et al., supra note 39, at 1379-80.
48. CoNLEY & O'BARR, supra note 46, at 66-67.
49. Professor Bruner's observations were based upon different, but overlapping
excerpts of the exchange between the advocate and the decision maker.
50. For a brilliant application of this insight in the advocacy context, see Anthony
G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Argwnents to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 55 (1992).
51. The clauses are: "thank you very much"; "good of you giving me the
opportunity"; "appreciated your letter"; "[the] care you took to write it"; "[your]
willingness to meet with us"; "he had [a] good session with you"; "you'd been kind and
understanding." Jerome Bruner, Narratives of Pleading, Lecture Twelve of the
Lawyering Theory Colloquium at New York University School of Law 15 (Spring 1991)
(transcript on file with the author).
52. The rate of occurrence was "roughly 1250 per 10,000 which is about as high
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first person pronoun."' Finally, a narrative tone of dilemma was created
as the advocate used, in 350 words of his opening narrative, eight
expressions in a syntactical form (the hypothetical preclusive disjunction
or its approximation) that represents the "Catch-22" that the client
suffered.-M This repeated use of the dilemma form played against the
repeated identifications of the decision maker as agent. It therefore
heightened the sense that the advocate and his client suffered a crisis that
could not be resolved without the decision maker's intervention. The
theme of the powerful decision maker and the helpless advocate and client

suggests that in this advocacy example, as in the lawyer-client

interviews,55 a subordinate role is a better predictor of deferential or

"powerless" discourse style than is the gender of the speaker.'
analysis of uncertainty signs reinforced that suggestion.

An

The language of the advocate and decision maker was searched for
signs of tentativeness and powerlessness that have been identified in

previous research.57 Four characteristics associated with the "feminine"

style appeared with some frequency:58 the previously discussed mental

verbs, hesitations,5

hedges,60 and intensifiers. 61 With respect to

as the article count in spoken English." Id.
53. Id. Only one of these first-person pronouns was in the subject position, and it
took an intransitive mental-state verb, "marking I as Experiencer rather than an agent."
Id.
54. Id. at 18.
55. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
56. It is important to note that more extensive and sophisticated conversational
analyses have found otherwise in the doctor-patient context. See Candace West, When
the DoctorIs a "Lady":Power, Status, and GenderIn Physician-PatientEncounters,7
SYMBOLC INTERACrION 87 (1984). Looking at the phenomenon of interruption, West
concluded that gender might have "primacy over status" in the medical context. Id. at
102.
57. See Davis, supra note 6, at 1652-53, 1664-65 for sources and definitions of
previously identified linguistic signs of uncertainty.
58. The Appendix has been marked to designate these signs.
59. Hesitation signs were defined to include false starts and filled pauses. A false
start is a word or phrase that the speaker does not complete, either because the speaker
discontinues speaking, without having been interrupted, or because the speaker switches
to a new topic (other than an aside) or to a reformulation of the discontinued utterance
(for example, "I want-I just want to know"). A filled pause is a hesitation, between
speaker turns or within a turn, during which the speaker makes an utterance that is not
subject-specific and is not responsiveto or encouraging of another's speech. Filled pauses
are sometimes words ("you know," "well," "like") and sometimes not ("ur," "uhm,"

"uh").
60. Hedges are modifiers that make an assertion less certain or precise (for example,

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 37

hesitations, hedges, and intensifiers, the difference between the advocate
and the decision maker was in the direction one would expect in light of
the lawyer's supplicating stance, and against the direction one would
expect in light of the fact that the lawyer was male and the bureaucrat
female. The supplicant hesitated far more frequently than did the
bureaucrat. The ratio was 22-to-14.5.Y The participants were closer with
respect to intensifiers, with the supplicant slightly ahead. The ratio was
10-to-7.9. The supplicant used two hedges, the bureaucrat, one, for a
ratio of 2-to-1.3. When these signs of tentativeness are combined, the
ratio is 34 for the advocate to 23.7 for the decision maker. Although
the sample is small, the count, taken together with the tone of the
exchange, is consistent with an expectation that the supplicant would
manifest deference by the use of more halting and less certain speech.
Moreover, it establishes a direct contrast with the manipulation of
voice represented by the advocate's infrequent and carefully placed
uses of mental verbs.
The sparing and strategic uses of mental verbs, taken together with
the pervasive use of other signs of uncertainty, allowed the advocate
to plead the essential facts of his case in terms that admit no
uncertainty. The existence of competing factual possibilities was
concealed by deftly, albeit unconsciously, chosen verbal formulations.
Yet, the advocate's overall tone was "pleading" and deferential,
emphasizing the power of the decision maker and suggesting
powerlessness on the part of the advocate and his client. By contrast,
the tone of the decision maker was relatively certain or "powerful,"
save for the subjective stance taken with respect to the facts and
meaning of the client's plight.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The most important thing to be said about this research is that it is
entirely preliminary. The patterns reported above are not findings
about how lawyers behave in advocacy settings. They are not the
product of study of a sample of interactions; they may be entirely
idiosyncratic. They are patterns of observation, determined both by the
content of the interactions under study and by the focus of the
observer. These patterns are reported to allow discussion and further
"I generally like ice cream").
61. Intensifiers are words that intensify an utterance but add little or nothing beyond
intensification to the meaning of the utterance and do not express certainty (for example,
"that person is really tall").
62. The lawyer's narrative was slightly longer than that of the bureaucrat (265
words as compared to 201). The ratios are calculated to account for this difference.
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goal is to identify a repertoire of markers that serve usefully to direct our
focus, to organize our observations, and to give meaning to the data
presented as we study lawyering behaviors. Even this small analysis is
suggestive for the process of identifying and interpreting prospective
markers.
Designations of hero and plight can be thought of as markers of the
stance and strategic bent of the teller of a lawyering story. Stance and
strategy are decipherable if we bear in mind that these designations
represent choices and that implicit in the choices are expressions of value.
The case of garnishment and firing that was negotiated by the advocate
and decision maker can be told with a variety of heroes and plights. It
might be the story of the advocate, the decision maker, the employer, or
the client's creditor. The protagonist's plight might be frustration in the
quest to save the client, challenge in the quest to keep the agency true to
its mission, interference in the quest to run a business, or disruption of a
quest to collect a debt. In choosing to star the client or the agency and to
set the plight in a quest to work and pay or to do good for the greatest
number, the advocate and decision maker centered the negotiation around
values that reflected their perspective, their goals, and their sense of
appropriate means. To highlight these narrative choices enhances critical
capacity and helps us to understand both intended and actual narrative
effect.
The orientation and coda of a narrative are similarly revealing.'
These introductions and concluding comments of narrative passages
contain seemingly involuntary pronouncements about the perceived or
intended meaning of a story. When the advocate began his story with the
observation that the client had faith in the decision maker's sympathy and
ended it with a "that's why" I did not understand your inability to help,
he framed his story as evidence of the desirability and feasibility of
helping. When the decision maker introduced her story with a reminder
that the advocate did not know the ropes and ended it with a "that's why"
we should not take the case, she framed her story as evidence that her
initial decision had been correct despite the advocate's suspicions to the
63. The identification of orientation and coda are not, of course, precise sciences.
They are interpretive choices that can be made in different ways by different analysts.
The same is true of the identification of hero and plight. These realities complicate, but
do not negate, the lessons of any particular narrative analysis. The defensibility of an
interpretive choice suggests that its implications for the speaker's strategy and stance are
also defensible, and this is so even if competing strategies and stances (implied by
competing interpretive choices) might also be in play. To take an example from this
study, the advocate's opening narrative is interpretable not only as the story of the client,
but also as the less complete story of the decision maker who might be a savior. Neither
interpretation is wrong. Both have defensible, and simultaneously defensible, implications
for the advocate's stance and strategy.
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contrary. Orientations and codas serve, then, as additional checkpoints in
discerning stance, strategy, and effectiveness.
Foregrounding of the selection ofvoice problematizes the meaning and
effect of the mental verb. The use of mental verbs has been counted as a
marker of deference or subordination and has been found analogous to
other uncertainty markers associated with "powerless" or "feminine"
discourse styles. In analyzing the lawyer-client interviews, it appeared that
the use of mental verbs was a sign, not only or especially of deference,
but of a conversational focus on the thoughts, opinions, and feelings of the
parties-an openness to exploration of matters beyond the "facts"
narrowly construed. In the context of advocacy, it appears that when
mental verbs are understood as means of designating voice, they can be
seen as markers of the speaker's commitment to an utterance. In both the
interview and the advocacy context, the mental verb seems to function
differently than other linguistic signs thought to signal deference or
subordination. The mental verb seems, then, to be both a more meaningful
and a more ambiguous marker than other linguistic signs of tentativeness.
The separate consideration of mental verbs may improve the
interpretive power of the device of tracking other uncertainty signs.
Lawyers' talk is often referred to as "pleading." "Prayer for relief" is
jargon as compatible for lawyers as is the term "claim." The plea carries
an implication of deference, yet, in the capacity to move a decision maker
to grant a prayer for relief, the lawyer exerts power. This power is
exercised in complex and subtle ways. The advocate's greater use of
hesitations, hedges, and intensifiers may have been idiosyncratic. On the
other hand, it may have reflected a significant aspect of a strategy of
pleading. Like the mental verb, these uncertainty signs may prove to be
more revealing of strategy and issue-specific stances than of habitual
stances of deference or subordination.
V.

CONCLUSION

The study of law-or of architecture-as a culturally embedded,
interactive process responds to the broader intellectual movement to
rediscover culture by making the tacit explicit and the familiar strange."4
This movement has stirred consciousness across the range of academic
disciplines. In the words of Bruner, "the mark of our own era-in the law
and in virtually every domain of human endeavor-is a quickened...
[sense] of the importance of explicit awareness, of consciousness, of the

64. For a description of that intellectual movement, see Jerome Bruner, On Making
It Strange Again, Opening Lecture of the Lawyering Theory Colloquium at New York
University School of Law (Spring 1991) (transcript on file with the author).
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dangers of hidden agendas."' Feminist consciousness-raising exemplifies
the spirit of this era, as does the post-modernist exhortation "to question
over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people's
mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is
familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions."' The goal
is to learn and to teach by exposing and taldng control of patterns of
behavior that have become automatic. The analytic process is not a certain
science but an interpretive way of working. The work involves focusing,
organizing, and understanding interactive events that mark strategy and
stance. The reward is a measure of protection against the nalvetd and the
habits that stifle the will to form.

65. Id. at 3.
66. MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Concern for Truth: An Interview by Francois Ewald,
in MICHEL FOUCAULT: PoLITIcs, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1977-1984, at 255, 265 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed. & Alan Sheridan trans.,
1988).
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APPENDIX

Attorney:

Well,' you,' urn,' uh' Kurt had said that you were quite3
understanding of his personal situation. And, uh,' that
you expressed an understanding of his, uh,' problems.
Uh,' in your letter to me you indicated that there was a
local policy that made your intervention in the matter
difficult. I wasn't entirely sure what the, uh,' nature of
the local policy was. Your description of it was quite3
clear, but I-we don't work in these matters very3 often.
Uh,1 I had told Kurt that we would take this and try to
resolve it if we could without a fee. He is, as you know,
in a-'in a ver9 bad financial situation. He's in a-a
real3 Catch-22 position, essentially. 2 If he gets another
job, uh,' he is subject to another garnishment and another
discharge. If he doesn't get another job, he can't pay off
the, uh,' loans that would, uh,1 uh,' get the Friendly
Finance Company, uh,l from garnishing any-'any of his
wages. He's very3 anxious to get his job back and very
anxious to repay the loan. In fact,3 I suggested a number
of things to him, such as bankruptcy, that would get him
out from underneath the obligation. And, uh,I his reaction
was that he wanted no part of those, that he, uh, I was,
uh,' very3 serious about wanting money that he felt he did
in fact3 owe. Uh,' I wasn't sure why in a situation like
this it was not appropriate for your agency to intervene
and thought I would explore that with you.

1
Administrator: Well, urn,' you explained that you're not familiar with

dealing with our office. But generally' we have very3
limited resources. All of the government offices are-'are
cut back these days. I think everyone understands it with
the'-the,' uh, I the economic crunch. The problem is that
we try to take the cases that affect the most amount of
people. And by doing that we've allocated the resources
in the best effective method. The problem with taking a
case like Kurt's is that, aside from the fact that we're not
sure that we would win on it should we do it, urm,' I
can't really see it affecting a good number of people. I

67. Mental verbs
- designates
-2 designates
-3" designates

are italicized.
hesitations.
hedges.
intensifiers.
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sympathize with his case. But really,' as I see it, he's a
kid out of high school who worked for a couple of years
in a gas station and, uh,' was-called in sick a few times
and, uh,' was just3 affected by that behavior. I think that
the garnishment was just3 one of many reasons. And I
think that that would get us into trouble. Should-'should
we decide to sympathize enough to engage any resources
in this. I really3 can't see us winning on it.

